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BOOK REVIEW by Charles Chotkowski:
"Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz."
By Jan T. Gross. 303 pp.
Random House. $25.95.
The
announcement that Jan T. Gross would publish a book
on anti-Semitism in postwar Poland prompted Polish
Americans to ask: would the new book be as bad a
book, and as bad for Poland and the Poles, as his
earlier book "Neighbors" on the
Jedwabne massacre?
"Fear" has now been published,
and turns out to be better than "Neighbors"
in its presentation of the facts, but worse in the
conclusions it draws. The
book has an additional subtitle, "An Essay in
Historical Interpretation,"
and Gross, more sociologist than historian, creates
an interpretation that
is bizarre.
As stated in the introduction,
Gross believes "it
was widespread collusion
in the Nazi-driven plunder, spoliation, and eventual
murder of the Jews that
generated Polish anti-Semitism after the war." His
case in point is the
Kielce pogrom of July 4, 1946.
But Gross begins, in Chapter 1 'Poland Abandoned',
with an account of how
the Poles resisted Nazi domination during World War
II, only to fall under
Communist domination afterwards.
Here one can read of the Katyn massacre of Polish officers
by the Soviets;
the failure of the Red Army to aid the Warsaw uprising
of 1944; and the
Yalta agreement, which left Poland to the Communists,
once Soviet power had
overwhelmed the non-Communist opposition.
Chapter 2 'The Unwelcoming of Jewish Survivors' is
a collection of anecdotes
of discrimination and violence from Jews who left postwar
Poland. Missing
are stories of those who stayed, like Marek Edelman,
a surviving commander
of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, or the musician Wladyslaw
Szpilman, whose
story was told in the film "Pianist."
Chapters 3 and 4, on the Kielce pogrom, are based on
generally accepted
accounts from Polish sources: the historian Bozena
Szaynok; Stanislaw
Meducki and Zenon Wrona, editors of a two volume collection
of documents;
and a 1997 report by the Institute of National Remembrance
(IPN), a Polish
government agency.
The Kielce pogrom began with a false allegation of
kidnapping. An eight year
old boy, Henryk Blaszczyk, left home on July 1, 1946
without informing his
parents. When he returned on July 3, he lied that he
had been seized by Jews
and later escaped.
The next morning his father took Henryk to the police
station; on the way
the boy pointed out a building at 7 Planty street,
where Jews lived, as the
place where he supposedly was held. A group of policemen
went to the
building, relaying the boy's accusations to bystanders,
who echoed the
accusations as fact.
As people gathered in front of the building, soldiers
sent to preserve order
learned of the accusations from the crowd. These soldiers
were the first to
enter the building and the first to start killing Jews,
a massacre that
policemen and civilians from the crowd soon joined.
Some 42 Jews were
murdered.
As Gross notes, there was a "breakdown of law
enforcement." Commanders of
the Communist regime's army, regular police and security
office (i.e. secret
police) failed to stop the violence.
An attempt by the government to blame the pogrom on
the non-Communist
opposition failed for lack of evidence, but led to
the suspicion that
Communist authorities had themselves instigated the
pogrom to discredit
their opponents.
Jan Zaryn, an IPN official who
edited "About the
Kielce Pogrom," a recently
published collective work, says about the inspiration
of the pogrom, "the
most comprehensive and logical is the concept of Soviet
or Security Office
provocation," but fears the full truth will never
be known.
Gross goes astray when he accuses the Catholic Church
in Poland of silence,
and calls the efforts of the clergy in Kielce to quell
the pogrom
"insignificant." He omits that the bishop of Kielce, Czeslaw Kaczmarek,
was
absent from the diocese, and fails to properly emphasize
government measures
to impede any response by the church.
When two priests tried to reach Planty street to calm
the crowd, they were
blocked by security officers. When the vicar general
of the diocese drafted
with the provincial governor a statement condemning
the violence, higher
officials blocked its publication.
The diocese did issue two pastoral letters on the pogrom
that were read in
the churches. Contrary to Gross's supposition, the
second letter was not
issued because the first was inadequate. The first
letter was sent only to
churches in the city of Kielce, the second to all the
churches of the
diocese.
Gross also misses the significance of the refusal by
workers summoned by the
government to approve resolutions condemning the pogrom.
These resolutions
had titles like "Pogrom of the Jews in Kielce:
Provocation of the
Reactionaries." The "reactionaries" were
the non-Communist opposition which
the workers supported.
The final section 'Conclusions' reveals the great flaw
in the book. Gross
explains the pogrom by asserting that postwar Polish
anti-Semitism was
different from the less virulent prewar anti-Semitism.
After the war Poles
hated Jews, Gross writes, because ordinary Poles had
plundered Jewish
property in "widespread collusion" with the
Nazis.
When the Jews returned, he argues, Poles feared the
Jews as claimants for
confiscated possessions, and as a living reproach to
Polish complicity:
"Jews were so frightening and dangerous ... because of what Poles had
done
to the Jews."
To validate his argument for Kielce, Gross should show
that the victims had
returned to Kielce to reclaim their properties, and
that the perpetrators
held formerly Jewish possessions. He has not done so,
nor could he. It
appears that the Jews of Planty street had arrived
from the Soviet Union,
and originally lived not in Kielce, but in the eastern
Polish borderlands.
Gross prefaces his theory with "Until someone
offers an alternative
explanation, we must consider that..." That is
bald assertion, not proof. It
is also a way to hold Poland and the Poles collectively
responsible for
Kielce without saying so.
The basic fact behind the Kielce pogrom is that following
over five years of
Nazi occupation, Poland was in the midst of a civil
war as Communist rule
was imposed on an unwilling people by force, at a cost
of 25,000 to 50,000
lives.
Where neither the government, nor the press, nor the
police could be
trusted, a population may be susceptible to suspicion
and rumor. When the
authorities are unwilling or unable to maintain order,
and indeed contribute
to disorder, lynching is possible. So it happened in
Kielce, so it has
happened in the United States.
Reviewed by:
Charles Chotkowski
Director of Research
Holocaust Documentation Committee
Polish American Congress
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